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Abstract:  This paper investigates how US and European equity markets affected the US 
dollar-euro rate from the introduction o f the euro through April 2001. More detailed the 
following questions are raised: First, do movements in the stock market help to explain 
movements in the exchange rate? Second, how large is the impact of stock market returns on 
the exchange rate? And third, does the exchange rate respond differently to different equity 
markets? The investigation was carried out using daily data within a vector-autoregression 
model (VAR). Surprisingly, positive returns on US equities as well as on European stock 
markets had a negative impact on the US dollar-euro rate. Quantitatively, the US dollar-euro 
rate seems to be more influenced by European stock markets compared to US stock markets. 
Further, there is evidence for a somewhat weaker impact of technology stock indices on the 
US dollar-euro rate compared with broader market indices. Finally, the long-term interest rate 
differential seems to contain more information about exchange rate movements than the short-
term interest rate differential. 
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On January 1, 1999 the euro was introduced as a new currency on the interna-
tional ¯nancial markets representing eleven member states which irrevocably
¯xed their domestic currencies against the newly created euro.1 Over the
next two years the euro almost steadily depreciated against the major cur-
rencies (see ¯gure 1 for the dollar-euro rate). This gave reason to an extensive
discussion about the source(s) of that widely unexpected performance of the
euro on foreign exchange markets. This paper investigates how the main eq-
uity markets in°uenced the external value of the euro from its start through
April 2001.
More detailed the following questions are raised:
1. Do movements in the stock market help to explain movements in the
exchange rate?
2. How large is the impact of stock market returns on the exchange rate?
3. Does the exchange rate respond di®erently to di®erent equity markets?
The investigation was carried out using a vector-autoregression model
(VAR).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After presenting
the results of earlier studies on this subject in section two, section three
introduces the framework for our analysis. Section four gives details on
the data, descriptive statistics, and speci¯cation tests. In section ¯ve the
estimation results are presented. Section six concludes.
2 Previous Studies
In its May 2001 World Economic Outlook (WEO) the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) discusses possible sources of the weakness of the euro and
the strength of the US dollar with a closer look at the contribution of ex-
change rate models to explain observed facts. Conventional theory predicts
an appreciation of the domestic currency when the current account is in
surplus (current transactions imply a higher demand for home currency) or
domestic interest rates exceed foreign interest rates (excess returns increase
the demand for domestic currency). But, in practice, the euro depreciated
despite the record current account de¯cit of the US, the interest rate hikes
of the European Central Bank, and the interest rate cuts of the Federal Re-
serve. Another explanation emphasizes the bilateral portfolio equity °ows
1Greece joined the European Monetary Union at the beginning of 2001 as its twelfth
member.
1out of the euro area.2 Net capital in°ows into the US increased from $25 bil-
lion in the early 1990's to almost $500 billion in 2000, with increasing weight
on government agency bonds, corporate bonds, and in particular equities.3
Further, there is a considerable increase of net in°ows from the euro area,
which is not the case for in°ows from Japan. The empirical investigation
carried out in the May 2001 WEO yields the following results:4
- Equity °ows matter for the dollar-euro rate, but not for the yen-dollar
rate.
- There is little evidence for the importance of merger and acquisition
°ows for the (dollar-euro and yen-dollar) exchange rate.
- No signi¯cant impact of net bond °ows on the exchange rate, either
dollar-euro or yen-dollar.
- The long-term interest rate di®erentials matter for the dollar-euro as
well as the yen-dollar rate, while short-term interest rate di®erentials do not.
The increasing weight of equity °ows emphasizes the importance of future
growth prospects for the determination of the exchange rate.
Along those lines, Corsetti and Pesenti (1999) argue in their early assess-
ment of EMU that the growth di®erential accounts for the observed depre-
ciation up to that time. The depreciation of the euro went in line with the
revisions of growth forecasts for both currency areas. But even now, when
growth forecasts for the US are sharply revised downwards, the euro does
not seem to gain in value.
Cohen and Loisel (2000) investigated the euros performance from January
1999 through March 2000. Within their framework, which is closely related
to ours, they used daily Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) stock
market indices and the short-term interest rate di®erential between the US
and Euroland to explain daily movements of the dollar-euro rate. Impulse
response analysis surprisingly indicated that the euro depreciated after a pos-
itive supply shock within the euro area (measured by a positive innovation to
the MSCI index for Euroland), a result which is con¯rmed in this study. They
provided a Mundell-Fleming type of explanation to their results. According
to Cohen and Loisel (2000), coordination failure among EMU member coun-
2See IMF (2001), p. 70 and the references given there.
3See IMF (2001), pp. 70-71.
4See IMF (2001), pp. 72-73. Bivariate regressions using quarterly data covering the
period from 1988 through 2000 were estimated. Explanatory variables in the bivariate
regressions were (a) current account and capital °ow variables such as bilateral current
account balance, bilateral net bond °ows, bilateral net equity °ows, and net foreign in-
vestment; (b) traditional underlying factors such as long-term and short-term interest rate
di®erentials, and relative current growth; as well as (c) alternative underlying factors such
as relative stock returns and relative expected growth.
2tries let their ¯scal policies be too tight, causing the depreciation of the euro.
In an environment of low demand in the euro area, a positive supply shock
needed to be absorbed outside the euro area through a depreciated currency.
Compared to that, demand in the US was strong; a supply shock in the US
was absorbed internally. However, this explanation does not hold for the yen-
dollar rate. While ¯scal policy in Japan can be considered as loose, overall
demand is rather low.5 Within the Mundell-Fleming set-up, it is excess de-
mand which ¯nally causes the appreciation of the home currency. A positive
supply shock in Japan should therefore have the same consequences for the
yen (i.e. depreciate the currency) as a positive supply shock in the euro area
for the euro.
A di®erent approach to explain exchange rate movements does not rely
so heavily on fundamentals. Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) called the discon-
nection of exchange rates from fundamentals an "outstanding puzzle in in-
ternational ¯nance".6 Meese and Rogo® (1983) found that macroeconomic
models can not predict exchange rates better than a random walk, at least
at short horizons. Baxter and Stokman (1989) emphasized the mismatch of
exchange rate volatility with variations of fundamental macroeconomic vari-
ables under a °oating exchange rate regime. DeGrauwe (2000) provides an
intuitive explanation for the disconnection-puzzle. He argues that there is
"great uncertainty about the true equilibrium value of the exchange rate".7
The uncertainty emerges for two reasons: First, the di±culty to predict fu-
ture values of fundamentals, and second, the uncertainty of the transmission
process from the fundamentals to the exchange rate. Hence, speculative dy-
namics arise in foreign exchange markets in which chartists interact with fun-
damentalists. "Exchange rate movements themselves 'frame' ('anchor') the
markets perception of fundamental strength or weakness of the economy".8
An appreciating currency must be a sign of a strong economy. Within that
frame new information will be evaluated. Agents tend to select news which
corroborate their perception and disregard news which are contrary to their
beliefs. This process can only continue as long as the discrepancy between
beliefs and facts becomes not too large.
Sinn and Westermann (2001) claimed that currency substitution accounts
for the weak euro. DM banknotes circulating in Eastern Europe and in
the black economy in Europe as a whole are converted into other (hard)
5According to the May 2001 World Economic Outlook Japan's output gap for 2000 was
-3.3 percent of GDP.
6Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000), p. 31. Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) presented a model
with transaction costs to explain the disconnection of exchange rates and prices.
7De Grauwe (2000), p. 16.
8De Grauwe (2000), p. 27.
3currencies, mainly the US-dollar, due to uncertainty about the changeover or
to avoid bank transactions. They argue that the residual of their estimated
demand function for the German monetary base re°ects that substitution
process. However, it remains unclear, whether the unexplained decline of the
German monetary base is due to the substitution of DM-cash holdings with
US-dollar holdings in Eastern Europe and/or the black economy or due to
substitutional e®ects between the monetary base and other components of
broader monetary aggregates.
Following the evidence presented in IMF (2001), our study concentrates
on the role of equity returns for exchange rate movements and extends the
scope of the analysis of Cohen and Loisel (2000) in three directions. First, we
investigate the response of the dollar-euro rate to shocks to di®erent stock
markets: technology stocks vs. broader market indices. Second, we try
to quantify the size of the impact of the di®erent markets using variance
decompositions; and third, we include the long-term interest rate di®erential
into the analysis.
3 Framework of Analysis
3.1 Theoretical Background
A natural starting point for the analysis of exchange rate movements is the
well known interest parity (IP). The IP re°ects the idea that in equilibrium
returns on domestic assets should equal those on foreign assets adjusted for
expected exchange rate movements. Hence, the exchange rate adjusts such
that expected returns on domestic and foreign assets (in domestic currency)
equalize.9
In this paper we take a wider interpretation of the uncovered interest
parity (UIP), to include stock market returns. Nevertheless, returns on US
dollar assets should equal returns on euro denominated assets, adjusted for
expected exchange rate movements. Some authors call that relation uncov-
ered asset return parity (UAP).10
Et¡1(et) ¡ et¡1 = ®Et¡1(rt) ¡ ¯Et¡1(r
¤
t) + °(it ¡ i
¤
t) (1)
Expected movements in the exchange rate (Et¡1(et) ¡ et¡1), (e denotes the
log of the exchange rate quoted in units of domestic currency for one unit
9IP in its uncovered form, i.e. with unsettled exchange rate risk performs poor empiri-
cally; while the covered IP (exchange rate risk is eliminated through forward transactions)
holds almost perfectly.
10See for example Fratzscher (2001).
4of foreign currency) are a function of expected returns on domestic stocks
(Et¡1(rt)), expected returns on foreign stocks (Et¡1(r¤
t)), and the interest
rate di®erential (it ¡ i¤
t). We assume that the response of the exchange
rate to domestic and foreign interest rate innovations is symmetric, while we
allow for an asymmetric response to returns on domestic and foreign equities.
Positive expected returns on domestic equities, negative expected returns on
foreign equities, and a positive interest rate di®erential should lead to an
appreciation of the domestic currency.
Some di±culty arises if one wants to measure the expected movement in
the exchange rate. Forward rates are not an appropriate measure, because
they are tied to the di®erence in interest rates over that speci¯c time horizon
(covered interest parity, CIP); otherwise there would be an arbitrage oppor-
tunity. The same problem applies to expected stock returns. To solve this
problem, we used ex post materialized changes in the exchange rate and the
relevant stock markets as a proxy for expected changes in these variables.
The di®erence between expected and actual returns is "t, a serially uncorre-
lated zero-mean shock. That deviates, strictly speaking, from the UIP, but
nevertheless there may be some merit for an "ex post UIP" or "ex post UAP"
(eq. 2).
¢et = ®rt ¡ ¯r
¤
t + °(it ¡ i
¤
t) + "t (2)
3.2 Empirical Modeling
3.2.1 Motivation
The investigation was carried out using a vector-autoregression model (VAR),
since we are interested in (a) the interdependence of the variables, i.e. the
response of one variable to a shock to another variable, and (b) the size of
that impact. The variables included in the system are those of the UAP.
Byt = ¡0 +
L X
s=1
¡syt¡s + "t (3)
Equation (3) gives the structural form of the VAR. yt is a vector including
all variables at time t, ¡0 is a vector of constants, ¡s include the coe±cients
on the lags of yt, and "t is a vector containing the structural shocks. The B
matrix describes the contemporaneous interdependence among the variables
in the system. Premultiplication by B¡1 yields the VAR in standard form
5(eq. (4)) which can be estimated by OLS.
yt = A0 +
L X
s=1
Asyt¡s + et , with Ax = B
¡1¡x and et = B
¡1"t (4)
3.2.2 Identifying Restrictions
The common problem in VARs with estimating impulse response functions or
variance decompositions is that one has to impose additional identifying re-
strictions to recover the structural shocks. Having done that, the calculation
of the impact of a structural shock on all other variables is straightforward.
To recover the structural shocks we relied on the Choleski decomposition,
which factors the variance-covariance matrix (V CV ) of the residuals into a
single lower triangular matrix P, for which V CV = PP0 holds.11
V CV = 1=T
T P
t=1
ete0
t = 1=T
T P
t=1
B¡1"t"0
tB¡10 = B¡1DB¡10 = PP0 , with
D = 1=T
T P
t=1
"t"0
t
D is the variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks. D has the
variances of the structural shocks on its diagonal, the other elements are zero
(the covariances between the structural shocks are zero).
The Choleski decomposition is equivalent to the assumption that a shock
to the variable ordered ¯rst contemporaneously a®ects all other variables,
a shock to the variable ordered second a®ects all variables except the ¯rst
contemporaneously, and so on (a shock to the last variable has a contempo-
raneous impact only on itself). Because of the lags of each variable included
in the VAR all variables a®ect all other variables in the system with no more
than a lag of one period, in our case after one day.
One can justify the use of that particular decomposition by building on
the di®erence in trading hours: the European markets can react to the close
of US markets only with a lag of one day. Further we use the daily foreign
exchange reference rates from the European Central Bank (ECB), which are
determined around 2:15 p.m. ECB time each day, a time when European
markets are still open and US markets have not opened yet. These argu-
ments suggest an ordering of these three variables as follows: exchange rate,
European market, US market.
However, to adopt a framework as general as possible, we do not stick
with a particular ordering (and the implied restrictions). Instead, the system
11Hamilton (1994), pp. 91-92.
6was estimated across all possible combinations of the four variables, to let
every variable contemporaneously a®ect the others and in turn being a®ected
contemporaneously by the other variables in the system. There are two
reasons for that approach: First, we are interested in the upper and the
lower bound of the information share that one variable contributes to the
other, and, second, we want to test the sensitivity of our results to the
ordering of the variables. The variable ordered ¯rst maximizes its impact
on all the others, while the variable ordered last ¯nds its impact on the
others minimized.
3.2.3 Innovation Accounting
If the variables in the VAR are covariance stationary, then there exists a
vector-moving-average representation (VMA), eq. (5).
yt = ¹ +
1 X
i=0
ªiet¡i = ¹ +
1 X
i=0
©i"t¡i , where ªi = A
i
1 and ©i = ªiB
¡1 = A
i
1B
¡1
(5)
The ©i matrices contain the coe±cients, which describe the impact of the
structural shocks on all variables.
©i =
2
6 6 6
4
Á
(i)
11 Á
(i)
12 Á
(i)
13 Á
(i)
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Á
(i)
21 Á
(i)
22 Á
(i)
23 Á
(i)
24
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(i)
31 Á
(i)
32 Á
(i)
33 Á
(i)
34
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(i)
41 Á
(i)
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(i)
43 Á
(i)
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3
7 7 7
5
(6)
Á
(1)
11 is the impact of a structural shock to the ¯rst variable on the ¯rst vari-
able after one period, Á
(10)
42 is the impact of a structural shock to the second
variable on the fourth variable after ten periods. A plot of row j, column
k element of ©i as a function of i is called the impulse response function.12
Summing up the individual Á
(i)
jk from i = 0;:::;I gives the accumulated re-
sponse of variable j to a structural shock to variable k. The accumulated
impulse responses of the ¯rst di®erence correspond to the impulse response
of the level.
Another tool to describe the interactions among the variables is the fore-
cast error variance decomposition. Starting over from the VMA representa-
tion of the VAR, the forecast error n periods ahead is
yt+n ¡ E(yt+n) =
n¡1 X
i=0
©i"t+n¡i (7)
12See Hamilton (1994), p. 319.
7The forecast error can be decomposed into the contributions of the individual
structural shocks. Since the weights and the variances of the structural shocks
are known, it is possible to assign a certain proportion of the total forecast
error variance to the variance of each structural shock. We refer to that
proportion as the information share.13
4 Data, Descriptive Statistics, and Speci¯ca-
tion Tests
Data. All data is at daily frequency and covers the period from January 4,
1999 through April 30, 2001 for a total of 597 observations. Exchange rates
are daily reference rates of the European Central Bank (ECB), obtained from
the ECB's website. As stock market returns we considered Dow Jones Euro
Stoxx 50 (DJES 50), Nemax 50, Standard & Poor's 500 (S&P 500), Nasdaq
100, and Nikkei 225 (all obtained from datastream). As short-term interest
rates we used the Euro Overnight Index Average (Eonia), the overnight rate
on Japanese government bonds (both from datastream), and the Federal
Funds rate (from the website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System). Long-term interest rates are 10 year bond yields for Germany, the
US, and Japan, obtained from datastream. Daily returns are calculated as
the ¯rst di®erence of the log of the speci¯c series. Table 1 displays some
descriptive statistics.
Correlations. Changes in the dollar-euro rate are negatively correlated
with contemporaneous and one day lagged returns on Euroland stocks as
well as on US stocks (see table 2). Stock market returns in Euroland have a
larger negative contemporaneous correlation with the dollar-euro rate, while
US stock market returns have a larger negative correlation at a lag of one
day. Changes in the yen-dollar rate are positively correlated with US stock
market returns with a lag of one day, and negatively correlated with Japanese
stock market returns.
Stock market returns for the euro area are positively correlated with cur-
rent and one day lagged returns on US-indices, while the returns on the
Japanese Nikkei 225 are only positively correlated with returns on the S&P
500 with a lag of one day. The signi¯cant lag of one day may be due to the
in°uence of the US stock markets as the world's largest stock market on other
markets and/or to non-overlapping trading hours. Interest rate di®erentials
do not show any signi¯cant correlation with any of the other variables.
13For a related application of the forecast error variance decomposition to equity trading
see Grammig et al. (2001).
8Unit Roots. The dollar-euro rate, the stock market indices in Europe
and in the US, and the short-term interest rate di®erential are found to
be I(1).14 However, the long-term interest rate di®erential was found to be
stationary at the 5% level of signi¯cance. The same applies to the time
series concerning Japan: the yen-dollar rate, the stock market index, and the
short-term interest rate di®erential are I(1), only the long-term interest rate
di®erential is stationary at the 5% level of signi¯cance.
Following the UAP, the variables we want to include in our estimation are
the change in the exchange rate, the change of the stock market indices, and
the level of the interest rate di®erential. There seems to be no problem when
using the long-term interest rate di®erential, because then all variables in
the system are stationary. However, the short-term interest rate di®erential
raises some di±culties: theory suggests to use the level, the VAR requires
stationarity. We decided to estimate both systems. As will be discussed in
the next section, it did not really matter, because the short-term interest
rate di®erential (in level as well as in ¯rst di®erence) did not contribute to
the explanation of the other variables.
Lag Length. To specify the lag order of the VAR we relied on likelihood
ratio tests (LR) and the Akaike Info Criterion (AIC).15 Using these test
statistics we found overwhelming evidence for the inclusion of three lags in
VAR-models including the short-term interest rate di®erential. For VAR-
models including the long-term interest rate di®erential, LR-tests and the
AIC improved only marginally when two instead of three lags were used.
Since we want to compare the results across di®erent systems, we decided to
include three lags in all estimated VARs.
Cointegration. To discriminate between a VAR-speci¯cation in ¯rst
di®erences and a Vector-errorcorrection (VEC) speci¯cation, we followed Jo-
hansen to test for cointegration. We found no evidence for a cointegrating
relation between the dollar-euro rate, the stock market indices for Europe
and the US, and the long-term interest rate di®erential or any subset of
these variables. The same result emerges when the related time series for
Japan are tested. Therefore, we stick with the VAR speci¯cation in ¯rst
di®erences. A cointegrating relation was found when the long-term interest
rate di®erential was replaced by its short-term counterpart. That result also
holds for Euroland-US system and the Japan-US system (see table 4). Again,
we stress the reader's patience and refer to the next section for a proof that
the use of the short-term interest rate di®erential is inappropriate.
14Tested using DF or ADF tests. The test results are reported in table 3.
15For a recent discussion of lag-order selection criteria see Kilian and Ivanov (2001).
95 Estimation Results
5.1 Interest Rate Di®erentials
Because of the overwhelming theoretical foundation and despite the poor
empirical evidence, we considered the short-term interest di®erential into our
set of variables. Since we are investigating the sources of daily exchange rate
movements, the overnight interest rates seem to be the appropriate measure.
However, as indicated in IMF (2001) and con¯rmed in this study, long-term
interest rates seem to have a considerably higher impact on the exchange
rate than short-term interest rates.
5.1.1 The Short-Term Interest Rate Di®erential
Block exogeneity and block causality tests indicated that a model speci¯ca-
tion without the short-term interest rate di®erential is su±cient. Granger-
causality tests on the equations of all other variables of the VAR-system
also indicated that the null hypothesis that all coe±cients on the short-term
interest rate di®erential are zero could not be rejected. Impulse response
analysis revealed that unanticipated shocks to the short-term interest rate
di®erential had no signi¯cant impact on the exchange rate or stock markets.
Estimating a VEC-model, using the cointegrating relation suggested by the
Johansen test, did not change that result at all.
5.1.2 The Long-Term Interest Rate Di®erential
Block exogeneity and block causality tests indicated that a model speci¯ca-
tion without the long-term interest rate di®erential is su±cient.16 However,
there is strong evidence in favor of the current value of the long-term interest
rate di®erential. Granger-causality tests indicated that the null hypothesis
that all coe±cients on the long-term interest rate di®erential are zero could
not be rejected for the exchange rate equation and the DJES 50 equation,
but is rejected at the 8% level for the S&P 500 equation (and at the 1% level
for long-term interest rate di®erential equation). Further, impulse response
analysis shows a signi¯cant impact of the long-term rates on the other vari-
ables. Therefore all systems are estimated using the respective long-term
interest rate di®erential.
16The block exogeneity test and the block causality test indicated that the correlation
of the residuals is not reduced signi¯cantly when the long-term interest rate di®erential is
included. The restrictions were signi¯cant at the 14% level and the 77% level, respectively.
The large di®erence is due to the current value of the long-term interest rate di®erential,
which is signi¯cant at standard levels.
105.2 Impulse Response Analysis
5.2.1 System with DJ Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) describe the response of a variable to a
shock to a certain variable included in the system over a given time horizon.
They are estimated by imposing the identifying restrictions of the Choleski
decomposition (limited contemporaneous interdependence) across various or-
derings. Two representative sets of the IRFs and their corresponding two
standard deviation con¯dence intervals are shown in ¯gures 8 and 9. Error
bands are computed using the Monte Carlo method.17 Some fairly robust
results emerge:
- The dollar-euro rate, the DJES 50, and the S&P 500 are highly persis-
tent, a positive innovation to itself has a permanent impact. That con¯rms
the result of the unit root tests.
- A positive innovation to the DJES 50 signi¯cantly depreciates the euro
against the dollar. This result is robust with respect to the ordering of the
variables in the VAR.
- A positive shock to the S&P 500 let the dollar signi¯cantly appreciate
against the euro in the very short run. However, the evidence becomes mixed
after a few periods. Depending on the ordering of the variables in the VAR-
system, the impact of a positive innovation to the S&P 500 on the US dollar
ranges from a signi¯cant appreciation over an insigni¯cant appreciation to a
signi¯cant depreciation.
- The depreciation of the euro after a positive innovation to the DJES 50
is larger than the depreciation of the euro after a positive innovation to the
S&P 500, suggesting that the link between the external value of the domestic
currency and the domestic stock market is closer for the euro area compared
to the US.
- The e®ect of a positive innovation to the exchange rate (depreciating the
dollar and appreciating the euro) on equity prices in the US and Euroland
remains unclear.
- A positive innovation to the S&P 500 has a permanent, signi¯cantly
positive impact on the DJES 50. The e®ect is about equally splitted into an
immediate and a one day lagged impact (if the speci¯cation allows for a con-
temporaneous impact). On the contrary, the impact of a positive innovation
to the DJES 50 on the S&P 500 depends on the ordering of the variables,
17Standard deviations of the IRFs are based on 100 simulations of the VAR, where
the coe±cients of the reduced form VAR model are drawn from a normal distribution
conditioned on the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals drawn from an inverse
Wishart distribution.
11and thus, remains unclear. That is a clear indication that European markets
follow US markets.
- Innovations to the long-term interest rate di®erential, de¯ned as the
yield on German government bonds with a remaining maturity of 10 years
minus the yield on US government 10year-bonds, have only small and very
short-lived e®ects on the other variables. A positive innovation to the long-
term interest rate di®erential, which could mirror a shock that increases
the German bond yield or a shock that lowers the US bond yield, slightly
appreciates the euro and let the S&P 500 as well as the DJES 50 increase.
These e®ects become insigni¯cant after a few days.
Most of the results are in line with theory. Positive innovations in a
country's stock market or interest rates let its currency appreciate, and stock
markets around the world are positively correlated. A more extensive dis-
cussion is needed with respect to the impact of innovations in the DJES 50
on the dollar-euro rate.
In the introduction, we highlighted the failure of conventional models to
explain the dollar-euro rate; further there seems to be some evidence that
equity °ows gained in importance for exchange rate movements over the last
years, especially for the dollar-euro rate. But what is driving these °ows?
According to our results, it is not returns. The euro depreciated despite
the good performance of equity markets in the euro area. It seems that
neither conventional (current transactions and interest rates) nor more recent
approaches (equity returns) help to explain the current low of the euro.
That leads to another possible argument, for which only anecdotal ev-
idence exists: There is a deep scepticism against the euro among market
participants. Those who were bullish for the euro since its start simply lost
a lot of money if they pursued their investment strategy. That argument is
in line with the idea of "framing" presented by de Grauwe (2000) and hints
at the possible importance of chartist trading in foreign exchange markets.
Exchange rate movements itself provide a "frame" in which news are inter-
preted. Now, when interest rates in the euro area and the US are as narrow
as they have not been for a long time, when growth in the US is lower than
in Euroland, and even Nasdaq came down, the euro remained weak. All
these pieces together were not enough to let the con¯dence return. On the
contrary, it may have deepened the scepticism.
5.2.2 System with Nasdaq 100 and Nemax 50
Turning to the investigation using indices of tech stocks, that is re-estimate
all systems using the Nemax 50, the Nasdaq 100 together with the dollar-euro
rate and the long-term interest rate di®erential. IRFs are shown in ¯gures
1210 and 11. The main results are qualitatively identical to those reported
for the system including the DJES 50 and the S&P 500. In addition some
ambiguities disappear. Deviations from the results reported above emerge
with respect to the size of the impulse responses. In detail:
- The surprising result of a depreciation of the euro after a positive inno-
vation to the home stock market (here Nemax 50) still holds.
- The IRFs of the exchange rate after a positive innovation to the Nasdaq
100 have now all a negative sign, although some remain insigni¯cant.
- Again, the size of the impact on the exchange rate is larger after a
positive innovation to the European index than the US index, suggesting a
closer link between equity and foreign exchange markets in Europe compared
with the US.
- Another interesting result is that the response of the exchange rate to
positive shocks to tech stocks is smaller compared with the response to pos-
itive shocks to broader market indices. Put it di®erent, Nemax and Nasdaq
had a smaller in°uence on the dollar-euro rate than the S&P or the DJ Euro
Stoxx.
- The response of the Nemax 50 to a shock to the Nasdaq 100 is almost
identical to the response of the DJES 50 to a shock to the S&P 500. How-
ever, the Nasdaq shows a non-ambiguous positive and signi¯cant relation to
innovations to the Nemax 50.
5.2.3 System with Nikkei 225 and S&P 500
To further enlighten the relation of exchange rate movements and stock mar-
ket returns, we apply our methodology to the yen-dollar rate, the Nikkei
225, the S&P 500, and the long-term interest rate di®erential between Japan
and the US. IRFs (displayed in ¯gure 12) are remarkably robust with re-
spect to the ordering of the variables. Here, the world is still in line with
theory: Positive returns on the Japanese stock market appreciate the yen,
while positive returns on the US stock market depreciate the Japanese yen,
at least initially (after four periods the impact is reversed to an appreciation
of the yen). Thus, there seem to be euro-speci¯c factors which account for
the weakness of the euro. Again, there is strong evidence for a closer link
between the Japanese stock market and the external value of the yen com-
pared to the link between the US stock market and the external value of the
US dollar.
135.3 Information Shares
What is the contribution of innovations in each stock market to the exchange
rate? We refer to the proportion of innovation variance in variable i explained
by innovations in variable j as its information share. The Choleski factoriza-
tion of VCV yields an upper bound of the impact for the variable ordered
¯rst and a lower bound on the impact for the variable ordered last. Decom-
posing the forecast error variance across systems with various orderings gives
a lower and an upper bound for the information share.
First of all, all variables explain most of their variation over all time
horizons itself (see table 6). In general, the information shares change very
little when the time horizon is changed. We report ¯gures for a forecast
horizon of 20 business days. Innovations to the DJES 50 explain between 2
and 5.6 percent of the volatility of the dollar-euro rate. Innovations to the
S&P 500 explain from 1.5 to 2.5 percent of the volatility of the exchange
rate. Again, as the impulse response the share of the forecast error variance
is lower for tech indices. Innovations to the Nemax 50 explain between 0.4
and 2.3 percent of the volatility of the dollar-euro rate, while innovations
to the Nasdaq 100 explain between 0.6 and 2.0 percent of that volatility.
Innovations to the long-term interest rate di®erential explain from 2.4 to
3.9 percent of the volatility of the dollar-euro rate regardless which stock
market indices are included. For the explanation of the volatility of the
yen-dollar rate the contribution of innovations to the Nikkei 225 range from
2.4 to 2.6 percent, while the contribution of innovations to the S&P 500 is
between 2.1 and 2.2 percent, and the contribution of innovations to the long-
term interest rate di®erential is only 0.2 to 0.3 percent. Thus, according to
the impulse response functions and the variance decompositions two results
emerge: First, European stock markets have a higher impact on the dollar-
euro rate than US stock markets, and, second, technology indices have a
lower impact on the dollar-euro rate than broader market indices.
As a by-product we obtain some evidence on the integration of stock
markets: innovations to the S&P 500 explain between 13.6 and 30.3 percent
of the volatility of the DJES 50, and between 14.4 and 14.6 percent of the
volatility of the Nikkei 225. On the other side, the S&P 500 is basically unaf-
fected by the Nikkei 225 (0.1-0.4 percent of its volatility is due to innovations
to the Nikkei 225) and little a®ected by the DJES 50 (0.6-22.7 percent of its
volatility is due to innovations to the DJES 50). That underlines the sizeable
impact of US equity markets on European and Japanese equity markets.
According to the results of our variance decomposition, markets for tech-
nology stocks seem to be somewhat less integrated compared with their
broader counterparts. Innovations to the Nasdaq 100 explain between 9.4
14and 26.6 percent of the volatility of the Nemax 50; innovations to the Nemax
50 explain between 0.1 and 19.2 percent of the volatility of the Nasdaq 100.
6 Conclusion
The depreciation of the euro is at odds with conventional theory. The euro
depreciated despite the growing current account de¯cit of the US, despite
the interest rate hikes of the ECB and cuts of the Federal Reserve which
narrowed (most recently inverted) the short-term interest rate di®erential,
and despite the narrowing of the long term interest rate di®erential. But
also more recent attempts to explain the weakness of the euro, such as net
capital °ows, have some shortcomings. Our study provides evidence against
the theory that equity returns are the driving force of the weakness of the
euro. Even when European stock market performed well the euro depre-
ciated. However, we found some other interesting results. Stock market
returns and the long-term interest rate di®erential seem to be about equally
important in explaining movements in the dollar-euro rate, and clearly more
important than the short-term interest rate di®erential. Stock market re-
turns are more important than the long- and the short-term interest rate
di®erential in explaining movements in the yen-dollar rate. Exchange rates
and stock markets seem to be linked more closely in the euro area and Japan
when compared with the US. The dollar-euro rate seems to be somewhat
less a®ected by technology stock market indices compared to broader market
indices.
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16A Tables
Series  Obs  Mean  Std Error  Minimum  Maximum 
           
Level of …           
Dollar/Euro  597  0.9842  0.0834  0.8252  1.1790 
Yen/Dollar  597  111.9832  6.4399  101.6200  126.3500 
DJ Euro Stoxx 50  597  4428.44  655.43  3325.56  5464.43 
Nemax 50  597  4615.61  1672.58  1305.25  9603.46 
S&P 500  597  1359.87  87.03  1103.25  1527.45 
Nasdaq 100  597  2849.65  794.43  1370.75  4704.73 
Nikkei 225  597  16484.06  2065.44  11819.70  20833.21 
Fed Funds  597  5.59  0.69  4.23  7.03 
Eonia  597  3.63  0.94  1.74  5.75 
Jap. Gov. Bills Overnight  597  0.17  0.23  0.03  3.00 
Germany 10y Bonds  597  4.87  0.53  3.63  5.65 
US 10y Bonds  597  5.74  0.52  4.62  6.78 
Japan 10y Bonds  597  1.72  0.22  1.04  2.53 
Eonia - Fed Funds  597  -1.9659  0.7289  -3.5700  1.1200 
Japan Overnight - Fed 
Funds  597  -5.4268  0.6787  -6.9675  -2.9200 
10y Germany - 10y US  597  -0.8700  0.3667  -1.6710  -0.0770 
10y Japan - 10y US  597  -4.0133  0.5147  -5.0860  -2.3060 
           
1st difference of the log of …         
Dollar/Euro  596  -0.0005  0.0075  -0.0225  0.0420 
Yen/Dollar  596  0.0001  0.0071  -0.0288  0.0300 
DJ Euro Stoxx 50  596  0.0004  0.0135  -0.0485  0.0375 
Nemax 50  596  -0.0011  0.0311  -0.1279  0.1341 
S&P 500  596  0.0000  0.0132  -0.0600  0.0489 
Nasdaq 100  596  0.0000  0.0317  -0.1031  0.1720 
Nikkei 225  596  0.0001  0.0142  -0.0723  0.0722 
           
1st difference of …           
Fed Funds  596  -0.0009  0.1573  -1.1200  1.2600 
Eonia  596  0.0029  0.1550  -0.6900  1.1600 
Jap. Gov. Bills Overnight  596  -0.0004  0.1823  -2.1250  1.9375 
Germany 10yr Bonds  596  0.0011  0.0578  -0.2240  0.2070 
US 10y Bonds  596  0.0021  0.0450  -0.1390  0.1930 
Japan 10y Bonds  596  -0.0015  0.0484  -0.3110  0.2810 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Exchange Rates and Stock Market Indices
17i  DE,DXX (-i)  DE,DXX (+i)  DE,DSP (-i)  DE,DSP (+i)  DXX,DSP (-i)  DXX,DSP (+i) 
0  -0.1820    -0.0526    0.4464   
1  -0.1015  0.0903  -0.1319  0.0648  0.3309  -0.0173 
2  -0.0352  0.0046  0.0810  -0.0097  0.0135  -0.1091 
3  0.0397  0.0390  0.0140  0.0002  -0.0336  0.0099 
4  0.0225  0.0069  -0.0149  0.0896  -0.0370  -0.0247 
5  -0.0427  0.0256  -0.0273  0.0394  -0.0331  0.0031 
6  0.0245  -0.0094  0.0474  -0.0454  -0.0371  -0.0968 
7  0.0502  -0.0601  -0.0047  -0.0136  -0.0025  0.0074 
8  -0.0034  0.0142  -0.0101  0.0082  -0.0116  0.0236 
9  0.0664  -0.0557  0.0515  -0.0361  -0.1114  0.0217 
10  -0.0364  -0.0287  0.0527  -0.0678  0.0007  0.0455 
 
i  DE,DIFF (-i)  DE,DIFF (+i)  DE,DIFFL (-i)  DE,DIFFL (+i) 
0  -0.0235    0.0210   
1  -0.0144  -0.0058  0.0491  0.0252 
2  0.0095  0.0073  0.0172  0.0320 
3  0.0081  -0.0098  0.0188  0.0381 
4  0.0154  -0.0101  0.0161  0.0313 
5  -0.0140  0.0099  0.0188  0.0332 
6  -0.0227  -0.0107  0.0181  0.0382 
7  -0.0243  -0.0149  0.0211  0.0234 
8  -0.0081  -0.0068  0.0237  0.0361 
9  -0.0100  -0.0080  0.0154  0.0419 
10  -0.0111  -0.0048  0.0178  0.0519 
 
I  DE,DNEU (-i)  DE,DNEU (+i)  DE,DNAS (-i)  DE,DNAS (+i)  DNEU,DNAS 
(-i) 
DNEU,DNAS 
(+i) 
0  -0.1244    -0.0802    0.4005   
1  -0.0865  0.0396  -0.0934  0.0688  0.3068  -0.0445 
2  -0.0024  0.0359  0.0653  0.0069  -0.0262  -0.0269 
3  -0.0491  -0.0469  -0.0384  -0.0234  0.0186  0.0225 
4  -0.0175  0.0121  -0.0062  0.0637  0.0813  -0.0708 
5  -0.0305  0.0774  -0.0270  0.0390  0.0458  0.0574 
6  -0.0069  -0.0606  0.0276  -0.0523  -0.0648  -0.0886 
7  0.0209  -0.0659  -0.0105  -0.0182  0.0428  0.0729 
8  -0.0460  -0.0073  -0.0021  0.0358  0.0216  0.0573 
9  0.0540  0.0016  0.0534  -0.0081  -0.0283  0.0203 
10  -0.0050  -0.0652  0.0511  0.0035  0.0857  -0.0447 
 
i  DJU,DNIK (-i)  DJU,DNIK (+i)  DJU,DSP (-i)  DJU,DSP (+i)  DNIK,DSP (-i)  DNIK,DSP (+i) 
0  0.0571    0.0187    0.0451   
1  -0.0723  0.0345  0.0811  0.0176  0.3753  0.0012 
2  -0.1076  0.0445  -0.0175  -0.0131  0.0504  -0.0162 
3  -0.1331  0.0811  -0.1052  -0.0106  -0.0458  -0.0075 
4  0.0103  0.0326  -0.0845  0.0119  0.0155  0.0104 
5  0.0064  -0.0331  -0.0067  -0.0241  0.0475  -0.0296 
6  0.0300  -0.0116  -0.0665  -0.0324  -0.0188  0.0022 
7  -0.0059  0.0015  0.0363  -0.0259  -0.0285  -0.0166 
8  -0.0814  -0.0113  -0.0405  -0.0069  0.0203  0.0010 
9  0.0231  -0.0170  -0.0123  -0.0057  -0.0407  0.0253 
10  0.0167  -0.0614  -0.0738  0.0769  -0.1474  -0.0126 
 
i  DJU,DIFFJU (-i)  DJU,DIFFJU (+i)  DJU,DIFFLJ (-i)  DJU,DIFFLJ (+i) 
0  -0.0033    0.0331   
1  0.0011  0.0005  0.0524  0.0313 
2  -0.0133  -0.0010  0.0465  0.0242 
3  -0.0105  -0.0023  0.0559  0.0281 
4  0.0245  -0.0058  0.0620  0.0275 
5  0.0305  0.0042  0.0887  0.0228 
6  0.0067  -0.0152  0.0562  0.0206 
7  0.0051  -0.0195  0.0696  0.0142 
8  -0.0091  -0.0184  0.0613  0.0176 
9  -0.0202  -0.0078  0.0644  0.0128 
10  -0.0080  0.0067  0.0585  0.0132 
 
Key:   i  index of leads (+i) and lags (-i); 
1
st difference of the log of:  US dollar-euro rate (DE), DJES 50 (DXX), S&P 500 (DSP), 
Nemax 50 (DNEU), Nasdaq 100 (DNAS), yen-US dollar rate (DJU), Nikkei 225 (DNIK), 
Short-term interest rate differential euro-dollar (DIFF) and yen-dollar (DIFFJU), 
Long-term interest rate differential euro-dollar (DIFFL) and yen-dollar (DIFFLJ) 
 
Table 2: Correlations of First Di®erences of Exchange Rates, Stock Market
Indices, and Interest Rate Di®erentials over Various Leads and Lags
18  without trend  including trend 
Critical Values:  1%  5%  10%  1%  5%  10%    
  -3.43  -2.86  -2.57  -3.96  -3.41  -3.12    
  ***  **  *  ***  **  *     
Series 
Lags 
included 
in ADF-
test 
t-stat on 
(rho-1) 
Level 
of 
signifi-
cance 
Lags 
included 
in ADF-
test 
t-stat 
on 
(rho-1) 
Level 
of 
signifi-
cance 
t-stat 
on 
trend 
Level 
of 
signifi-
cance 
                 
Log of ...                 
Dollar/Euro  0  -1.859   0  -2.769    -2.198 *** 
Yen/Dollar  0  -1.037   0  -0.891    1.009  
DJ Euro Stoxx 50  0  -1.535   0  -1.233    0.226  
Nemax 50  0  0.140   0  -0.593    -2.419 *** 
S&P 500  0  -2.562   0  -2.466    -0.706  
Nasdaq 100  0  -1.380   0  -0.976    -1.457  
Nikkei 225  0  -1.504   0  -2.344    -2.543 *** 
               
Level of ...               
Sh-t int rate diff EU-US  2  -1.288   2  -2.576    2.767 *** 
L-t int rate diff EU-US  1  -1.329   1  -3.639 **  3.441 *** 
Sh-t int rate diff JA-US  2  -2.325   2  -1.904    -0.044  
L-t int rate diff JA-US  0  -2.992 **  0  -2.774    0.848  
             
1st difference of the log 
of ...              
Dollar/Euro  0  -24.488 ***         
Yen/Dollar  0  -25.179 ***         
DJ Euro Stoxx 50  0  -23.718 ***         
Nemax 50  0  -22.942 ***         
S&P 500  0  -24.365 ***         
Nasdaq 100  1  -19.607 ***         
Nikkei 225  0  -24.390 ***         
              
1st difference of ...              
Sh-t int rate diff EU-US  3  -17.112 ***         
L-t int rate diff GE-US  0  -33.471 ***         
Sh-t int rate diff JA-US  1  -30.735 ***         
L-t int rate diff JA-US  0  -25.665 ***         
 
Table 3: Unit Root Tests
19Series r = 0 r · 1
$/E Rate, DJES 50, S&P
500 (all in logs), and Short-
Term Int. Rate Di®.
48.25* 14.32
$/E Rate, Nemax 50, Nas-
daq 100 (all in logs), and
Short-Term Int. Rate Di®.
41.82 17.45
Y/$ Rate, Nikkei 225, S&P
500 (all in logs), and Short-
Term Int. Rate Di®.
57.43* 28.34
$/E Rate, DJES 50, S&P
500 (all in logs), and Long-
Term Int. Rate Di®.
30.89 15.10
$/E Rate, Nemax 50, Nas-
daq 100 (all in logs), and
Long-Term Int. Rate Di®.
31.92 15.78
Y/$ Rate, Nikkei 225, S&P
500 (all in logs), and Long-
Term Int. Rate Di®.
37.47 22.81
5% (1%) Osterwald and
Lenum (1992) Critical Val-
ues
47.21
(54.46)
29.68
(35.65)
*,** indicate signi¯cance
level
Table 4: Cointegration Tests
20DJ Euro Stoxx 
50 / S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
DJ Euro Stoxx 
50 Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
         
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.934  0.025  0.016  0.025 
DJ Stoxx 50  0.040  0.821  0.136  0.002 
S&P 500  0.009  0.223  0.757  0.011 
Int Rate Diff  0.008  0.038  0.003  0.951 
Nemax 50 / 
Nasdaq 100 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nemax 50 
Innovation 
Nasdaq 100 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
         
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.958  0.012  0.006  0.024 
Nemax 50  0.015  0.888  0.095  0.002 
Nasdaq100  0.012  0.186  0.796  0.006 
Int. Rate Diff  0.006  0.081  0.001  0.912 
Nikkei 225 / 
S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nikkei 225 
Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
         
Exchange Rate 
Y/$  0.952  0.025  0.021  0.002 
Nikkei 225  0.010  0.844  0.144  0.001 
S&P 500  0.002  0.004  0.989  0.006 
Int. Rate Diff  0.002  0.011  0.014  0.973 
 
Table 5: Information Shares of the Home-Market Index, the US-Market In-
dex, the Long-Term Interest Rate Di®erential, and the Exchange Rate vs
the US-Dollar. To obtain the information shares the system was ordered as fol-
lows: exchange rate, European (Japanese) stock market, US stock market, and
long-term interest rate di®erential. The time horizon of the forecast error variance
decomposition is 20 periods.
21DJ Euro Stoxx 
50 / S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
DJ Euro Stoxx 50 
Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.890  0.934  0.020  0.056  0.015  0.025  0.025  0.039 
DJ Stoxx 50  0.010  0.040  0.657  0.851  0.136  0.303  0.002  0.007 
S&P 500  0.005  0.009  0.006  0.227  0.756  0.978  0.010  0.017 
Int Rate Diff  0.000  0.008  0.011  0.038  0.000  0.018  0.951  0.984 
Nemax 50 / 
Nasdaq 100 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nemax 50 
Innovation 
Nasdaq 100 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.929  0.958  0.004  0.023  0.006  0.020  0.024  0.039 
Nemax 50  0.007  0.015  0.704  0.897  0.094  0.266  0.002  0.034 
Nasdaq100  0.005  0.012  0.001  0.192  0.793  0.990  0.005  0.023 
Int. Rate Diff  0.001  0.006  0.010  0.081  0.001  0.021  0.912  0.987 
Nikkei 225 / 
S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nikkei 225 
Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
Y/$  0.950  0.952  0.024  0.026  0.021  0.022  0.002  0.003 
Nikkei 225  0.010  0.010  0.843  0.845  0.144  0.146  0.001  0.001 
S&P 500  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.004  0.988  0.992  0.005  0.006 
Int. Rate Diff  0.000  0.002  0.008  0.011  0.013  0.019  0.971  0.975 
 
Table 6: Bounds for Information Shares Using the Long-Term Interest Rate
Di®erential. To obtain the lower and the upper bound on information shares
the system was estimated across all possible orderings. The time horizon of the
forecast error variance decomposition is 20 periods.
22DJ Euro Stoxx 
50 / S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
DJ Euro Stoxx 50 
Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.924  0.953  0.021  0.053  0.017  0.024  0.005  0.008 
DJ Stoxx 50  0.008  0.037  0.658  0.849  0.137  0.303  0.004  0.008 
S&P 500  0.005  0.008  0.006  0.229  0.763  0.987  0.002  0.003 
Int Rate Diff  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.021  0.005  0.020  0.971  0.987 
Nemax 50 / 
Nasdaq 100 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nemax 50 
Innovation 
Nasdaq 100 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
$/E  0.960  0.975  0.007  0.023  0.007  0.020  0.006  0.010 
Nemax 50  0.007  0.015  0.716  0.893  0.094  0.267  0.005  0.006 
Nasdaq100  0.004  0.011  0.001  0.192  0.795  0.989  0.005  0.009 
Int. Rate Diff  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.006  0.010  0.029  0.969  0.984 
Nikkei 225 / 
S&P 500 
Exchange Rate 
Innovation 
Nikkei 225 
Innovation 
S&P 500 
Innovation 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
Innovation 
  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX  MIN  MAX 
                 
Exchange Rate 
Y/$  0.953  0.954  0.023  0.025  0.019  0.021  0.001  0.003 
Nikkei 225  0.011  0.011  0.835  0.837  0.144  0.147  0.007  0.009 
S&P 500  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.004  0.977  0.988  0.009  0.017 
Int. Rate Diff  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.006  0.006  0.028  0.966  0.986 
 
Table 7: Bounds for Information Shares Using the Short-Term Interest Rate
Di®erential. To obtain the lower and the upper bound on information shares
the system was estimated across all possible orderings. The time horizon of the
forecast error variance decomposition is 20 periods.
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Figure 1: US Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate, Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50, and
S&P 500
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Figure 2: US Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate, Nemax 50, and Nasdaq 100
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Figure 3: US Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate and Short-Term Interest Rate
Di®erential (Euro-Dollar)
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Figure 4: US Dollar/Euro Exchange Rate and Long-Term Interest Rate Dif-
ferential (Euro-Dollar)
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Figure 5: Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate, Nikkei 225, and S&P 500
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Figure 6: Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate and Short-Term Interest Rate Dif-
ferential (Yen-Dollar)
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Figure 7: Yen/US Dollar Exchange Rate and Long-Term Interest Rate Dif-
ferential (Yen-Dollar)
27C Impulse Response Functions and Con¯dence
Intervals of +/- Two Standard Deviations
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Figure 8: System with Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500, ordered:
US Dollar-Euro Rate, DJES 50, S&P 500, and Long-Term Interest Rate
Di®erential
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Figure 9: System with Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500, ordered:
S&P 500, DJES 50, Long-Term Interest Rate Di®erential, and US Dollar-
Euro Rate
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Figure 10: System with Nemax 50 and Nasdaq 100, ordered: US Dollar-Euro
Rate, Nemax 50, Nasdaq 100, and Long-Term Interest Rate Di®erential
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Figure 11: System with Nemax 50 and Nasdaq 100, ordered: Nasdaq 100,
Nemax 50, Long-Term Interest Rate Di®erential, and US Dollar-Euro Rate
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Figure 12: System with Nikkei 225 and S&P 500
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